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In this Essay, Professors Tyler and Meares highlight the ways in which recent 
social science research supports the model of jurisprudence articulated by Justice 
Sotomayor. Her model defines building identification with political and legal 
institutions as an important goal for the Court.  It further suggests that this goal is best 
achieved when the Court exercises its authority using just procedures. That perspective 
is consistent with research on the foundations of popular legitimacy demonstrating that 
perceived procedural justice of the Court most strongly shapes it. Social science 
findings further reveal the factors shaping popular conceptions of procedural justice. 
 
In her recent concurring opinion in United States v. Jones,1 Justice 
Sotomayor addressed the question of what a lawful search means within the 
context of the Fourth Amendment. At issue in Jones was whether the 
government’s use of an electronic tracking device attached to the undercarriage 
of a Jeep Grand Cherokee beyond the ten days authorized by a warrant violated 
the Fourth Amendment.2 As she discussed the problems inherent to 
discretionary governmental decisions to target and track individuals, Justice 
Sotomayor framed her response not only as a question of physical trespass 
under the Fourth Amendment, which was the focus of Justice Scalia’s opinion 
for the Court, but also in terms of the impact of government actions on the 
“relationship between citizen and government in a way that is inimical to 
democratic society.”3  
Justice Sotomayor further developed this theme of avoiding distrust and 
alienation and instead focusing on how to further a desirable relationship 
between people, law, and government in her recent James A. Thomas Lecture, 
delivered at Yale Law School on February 3, 2014. In that lecture, the Justice 
                                                            
1. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 954 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
2. Id. at 948 (majority opinion). 
3. Id. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (quoting United States v. Cuevas-Perez, 640 F.3d 272, 
285 (7th Cir. 2011) (Flaum, J., concurring)). 
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argued that the goal of the law is to express our shared ideals as a society—and, 
through doing that, to enable everyone to identify with law and with our 
democracy and its political and legal institutions.4  
There are different methods of constitutional interpretation: originalism, 
textualism, purposivism, and so on. We think Justice Sotomayor’s initial 
opinions reflect a jurisprudence of process that emphasizes making decisions 
fairly. In carrying out this approach, Justice Sotomayor highlighted in her 
Thomas Lecture more than just her efforts to make transparent to readers that 
the Court’s decision in a particular case is fair. She also pointed to her own 
endeavors to humanize judges, helping people to see that they are well-
meaning individuals sincerely trying to do what is right, rather than people 
motivated by prejudice or ill will. In this manner, she noted, she hoped to 
encourage the public to have respect for the law as an important institution in 
our society as well as in their own lives. And through building respect for 
judges and the Court, Justice Sotomayor further indicated that she seeks to 
build support for government overall.5 While Justice Sotomayor did not cite to 
social science evidence as a justification for her position on these matters, we 
find the degree to which her model of jurisprudence accords with and is 
supported by the findings of recent social science research on the legal system 
striking. In particular, a large and diverse body of social science evidence on 
legitimacy and procedural justice supports the central arguments she outlines. 
This research focuses upon how law and the policies and practices of legal 
authorities are experienced by the public.  
i .  procedural fairness matters  
Our concern in this analysis is with people’s judgments about the fairness 
of the procedure that legal authorities use when they make decisions. Unlike 
the procedural justice of objective features of the legal system (e.g. adversarial 
vs. inquisitorial trial procedures), this concern is with whether people evaluate 
a legal procedure as being just or unjust. This question is important because 
the primary factor that people consider when they are deciding whether they 
feel a decision is legitimate and ought to be accepted is whether or not they 
believe that the authorities involved made their decision through a fair 
                                                            
4. Justice Sonia Sotomayor & Linda Greenhouse, A Conversation with Justice Sotomayor, 123 
YALE L.J. F. 375 (2014), http://yalelawjournal.org/forum/a-conversation-with-justice 
-sotomayor. 
5. See id. 
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procedure, irrespective of whether members of the public are evaluating 
decisions made by the Supreme Court or by local courts, or reacting to the 
decisions made or rules enacted by any legal authorities. Research clearly 
shows that procedural justice matters more than whether or not people agree 
with a decision or regard it as substantively fair.6 
Some of the elements researchers have found to be important when the 
public is evaluating the justice of decision-making procedures include whether 
they believe that all parties to a case are being given an opportunity to present 
evidence and state their views, whether they think the decisionmakers get the 
information they need to make good decisions, whether they believe the 
authorities consider the evidence impartially, and whether they view them as 
making unbiased and rule-based decisions that apply rules consistently across 
people and cases. These elements are all related to the fairness of 
decisionmaking, a core element in both objective7 and psychological 
evaluations of legal procedures.8 
While it was once commonly thought the people cared about procedurally 
fair decisionmaking because of its potential contribution to accurate outcomes 
or a person’s ability to control an outcome, much research now supports the 
view that people care about a much broader set of issues. Specifically, people 
understand the way in which they are treated by legal authorities to provide 
them with information about how that authority views them and the group or 
groups to which they belong. In other words, the way people interpret the 
fairness of procedures has a substantial relational component.9 
Justice Sotomayor indicated in her Thomas Lecture that her own goal has 
been to deal with cases through fair procedures. She said: “What I view as 
driving my jurisprudence is process. I can’t control the outcomes of cases. . . . 
And I can live with that if I perceive the process to be fair.”10 Her quote reflects 
a basic insight in the literature: procedures might be considered more “trait-
                                                            
6. See, e.g., JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL 
ANALYSIS (1975). 
7. See, e.g., DENIS JAMES GALLIGAN, DUE PROCESS AND FAIR PROCEDURES: A STUDY OF 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES (1996); Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 181, 183-90 (2004). 
8. See, e.g., THIBAUT & WALKER, supra note 6.  
9. Tom R. Tyler & E. Allan Lind, A Relational Model of Authority in Groups, 25 ADVANCES 
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 115 (1992). 
10. See Sotomayor & Greenhouse, supra note 4, at 2. 
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like”11 than outcomes, which are variable, or which may be extremely 
indeterminate in a particular case. For example, while it may not be obvious 
how a particular case should come out, it is almost always clear how parties 
should proceed and be treated in that particular case.12 Although the argument 
Justice Sotomayor presented in the Thomas Lecture focused upon her own 
efforts to pay close attention to facts and use objectively fair procedures when 
handling cases, studies suggest that this perspective on jurisprudence is a 
model for making decisions in ways that will be well received by the public, 
because the public is also strongly influenced by whether or not they believe 
judges are exercising their authority through fair procedures. And the 
consequences of a commitment to procedural justice, research shows, are 
congenial to Justice Sotomayor’s own aims for decisionmaking—greater trust 
in, and commitment to, law and government. People who believe the 
authorities are procedurally just also comply with the law more frequently on 
an everyday basis.13 
                                                            
11. See Joel Brockner & Phyllis Siegel, Understanding the Interaction Between Procedural and 
Distributive Justice: The Role of Trust, in TRUST IN ORGANIZATIONS: FRONTIERS OF THEORY 
AND RESEARCH 390, 404 (Roderick M. Kramer & Tom R. Tyler eds. 1996). 
12. Tracey L. Meares et al., Updating the Study of Punishment, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1171, 1194-95 
(2004). 
13. See, e.g., TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (2006) (a study of the residents of 
Chicago indicating that those who believe the police are procedurally just comply with the 
law more frequently in their everyday lives); Denise C. Gottfredson et al., How Drug 
Treatment Courts Work: An Analysis of Mediators, 44 J. OF RES. CRIME & DELINQUENCY 3, 3 
(2007) (a study of drug courts indicating that they reduce recidivism relative to alternatives, 
because “perceptions of procedural justice reduce crime”); Jonathan Jackson et al., Why Do 
People Comply with the Law? Legitimacy and the Influence of Legal Institutions, 52 BRITISH J. 
CRIMINOLOGY 1051, 1062 (2012) (a study of the public in England and Wales indicating that 
there is a pathway “from the procedural fairness of the police to compliance”); Michael D. 
Reisig et al., Compliance with the Law in Slovenia, EUR. J. ON CRIM. POL’Y & RES. (2013), 
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10610-013-9211-9 (finding that the procedural 
justice of the police influenced self-reported compliance with the law among young adults); 
Jason Sunshine & Tom R. Tyler, The Role of Procedural Justice and Legitimacy in Shaping 
Public Support for Policing, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 513, 535 (2003) (two surveys of the people in 
New York City “identify[ing] procedural justice as the primary antecedent of legitimacy” 
and shaping both compliance with the law and cooperation with police); Tom R. Tyler & 
Jonathan Jackson, Popular Legitimacy and the Exercise of Legal Authority: Motivating 
Compliance, Cooperation and Engagement, 20 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 78, 78-79 (2014) (a 
study of a random sample of Americans’ views about the police and the courts 
demonstrating that procedural justice shapes legitimacy, compliance, and cooperation); 
Heathcote W. Wales et al., Procedural Justice and the Mental Health Court Judge’s Role in 
Reducing Recidivism, 33 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 265, 265 (2010) (“Observed reductions in 
recidivism from participation in MHC [mental health court] are caused in part by the role of 
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i i .  relevant social science research  
A. Decision-Making Fairness  
There is a large body of empirical literature supporting Justice Sotomayor’s 
focus on process. The Justice suggests that she focuses upon making decisions 
through fair procedures, believing that this leads to high-quality decisions. The 
public shares this view and, when evaluating authorities such as judges, asks 
whether that authority used fair procedures to make a decision. That 
judgment, more than who wins or loses their case, shapes people’s views about 
the decision and the judge and their willingness to defer to judicial authority. It 
also shapes their views about the legitimacy of the courts and their overall 
willingness to comply with laws and cooperate with legal institutions.  
1. U.S. Supreme Court  
Tom R. Tyler and Gregory Mitchell have examined public acceptance of 
Supreme Court decisions in the context of the controversial issue of abortion 
rights.14 They inquired whether people who disagreed with the Court might 
nonetheless feel obligated to accept its decisions on this, or any other, issue. 
Utilizing interviews with a sample of members of the public, they found that a 
key issue underlying public acceptance of Supreme Court judgments was an 
evaluation of the procedural justice of Court decisionmaking. In their sample, 
people considered whether the Justices were honest, impartial, and based their 
decisions on case-relevant information, and respondents were further 
influenced by whether they felt the Justices respected citizens and their rights, 
considered their views, and cared about their concerns. The study identified a 
broad set of procedural justice concerns, including concerns about the 
                                                                                                                                               
the judge in conveying elements of procedural justice.”); Cynthia G. Lee et al., A Community 
Court Grows in Brooklyn: A Comprehensive Evaluation of the Red Hook Community Justice 
Center Final Report, NAT’L CENTER ST. CTS. 176 (2013), http://www.courtinnovation.org 
/sites/default/files/documents/RH%20Evaluation%20Final%20RRepor.pdf (“The Red 
Hook Community Justice Center appears to bring about a robust and sustained decrease in 
recidivism among adult misdemeanor offenders.”); Tom R. Tyler et al., Street Stops and 
Police Legitimacy: Teachable Moments in Young Urban Men’s Legal Socialization (Yale Law & 
Econ. Research Paper No. 476, 2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2289244 (finding that 
young men who viewed the police as acting through procedural justice were more willing to 
help by reporting crimes).  
14. Tom R. Tyler & Gregory Mitchell, Legitimacy and the Empowerment of Discretionary Legal 
Authority: The United States Supreme Court and Abortion Rights, 43 DUKE L.J. 703 (1994). 
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neutrality of decisionmaking that were central to the Court’s legitimacy. Tyler 
and Mitchell ultimately found that procedural justice meaningfully legitimated 
the Court and its decisions. The results of the study strongly supported the 
procedural justice argument in that those citizens who believed that the court 
used fair procedures to make their decisions both felt obligated to defer to 
them and did not support efforts to strip the Court of authority to make 
decisions in this area.  
2. Local and State Courts  
Most studies of procedural justice are of local or state courts rather than the 
United States Supreme Court. These studies support the argument that people 
are more satisfied with decisions when they believe those decisions are made 
through fair procedures.15 Further, people more willingly accept court decisions 
                                                            
15. See STEPHEN SHUTE ET AL., A FAIR HEARING? (2013) (finding that minority defendants’ 
confidence in the courts is linked to their procedural justice judgments); TYLER, supra note 
13 (studying residents of Chicago and indicating that those who believe the police are 
procedurally just comply with the law more frequently in their everyday lives); Ben 
Bradford, Voice, Neutrality and Respect: Use of Victim Support Services, Procedural Fairness and 
Confidence in the Criminal Justice System, 11 CRIMINOLOGY & CRIM. JUST. 345, 345 (2011) (“By 
providing [crime] victims with voice and a sense that someone is listening to and taking 
their concerns seriously, contact with victims services seems to be linked to more favourable 
overall assessments of the criminal justice system.”); Jonathan D. Casper et al., Procedural 
Justice in Felony Cases, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 483 (1988) (finding, based on interviews with 
people whose felony cases were disposed through the courts, that satisfaction with the 
handling of one’s case was linked to judgments about the procedural justice of the courts); 
Peter Dillon & Robert Emery, Divorce Mediation and Resolution of Child Custody Disputes: 
Long-Term Effects, 66 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 131, 131 (finding that nine years after a 
custody hearing those parents who thought the hearing was procedurally fair had “more 
frequent current contact with their children and greater involvement in current decisions 
about them”); Katherine M. Kitzmann & Robert E. Emery, Child and Family Coping One 
Year After Mediated and Litigated Child Custody Disputes, 8 J. FAM. PSYCHOL. 150 (1994) 
(finding in a longitudinal study that judgments about the fairness of child custody hearings 
had long-term implications for satisfaction and compliance); Katherine M. Kitzmann & 
Robert E. Emery, Procedural Justice and Parents’ Satisfaction in a Field Study of Child Custody 
Dispute Resolution, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 553 (1993) (reporting that interviews with parents 
following child custody hearings indicated that satisfaction was linked to judgments about 
whether the hearing was fairly conducted); Avishalom Tor et al., Fairness and the Willingness 
to Accept Plea Bargain Offers, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 97, 97 (2010) (“In contrast with the 
common assumption in the plea bargaining literature, we show fairness related concerns 
systematically impact defendants’ preferences and judgments.”); Tom R. Tyler, 
Multiculturalism and the Willingness of Citizens to Defer to Law and to Legal Authorities, 25 LAW 
& SOC. INQUIRY 983 (2000) (arguing that procedural justice shapes the willingness of the 
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if they believe court procedures are fair,16 and they are also more willing to 
cooperate with the courts, for example by testifying, if they believe that the 
courts function through fair procedures.17 Of particular importance is the 
finding that procedural justice promotes decision adherence that lasts over 
time.18 
                                                                                                                                               
members of both majority and minority ethnic groups to defer to law and legal authorities); 
Tom R. Tyler, Public Trust and Confidence in Legal Authorities: What Do Majority and 
Minority Group Members Want from the Law and Legal Institutions?, 19 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 215, 
215 (2001) [hereinafter Tyler, Public Trust] (“Analysis from several studies exploring the 
basis of public views support this procedural justice based model of public evaluation.”); Jo-
Anne Wemmers, Victims’ Experiences in the Criminal Justice System and Their Recovery from 
Crime, 19 INT’L REV. VICTIMOLOGY 221, 221 (2013) (“[U]nfair procedures were found to 
impact victims’ recovery.”); Jo-Anne Wemmers et al., What Is Procedural Justice: Criteria 
Used by Dutch Victims to Assess the Fairness of Criminal Justice Procedures, 8 SOC. JUST. RES. 
329 (1995) (finding that Dutch crime victims evaluated the criminal justice process through 
a procedural justice frame); Rashida Abuwala & Donald J. Farole, Jr., The Effects of the 
Harlem Housing Court on Tenant Perceptions of Justice, CENTER FOR CT. INNOVATION (2008), 
http://www.courtinnovation.org/sites/default/files/Harlem_Housing_Court_Study.pdf 
(finding that interviews with people appearing in the Harlem and downtown project courts 
suggest that fairer treatment was linked to higher satisfaction with the courts); Donald J. 
Farole, Jr., Public Perceptions of New York’s Courts: The New York State Residents Survey, 
CENTER FOR CT. INNOVATION 17 (2007), http://www.courtinnovation.org/sites/default/files 
/documents/NYS_Residents_Survey.pdf (suggesting that procedural justice was the most 
important factor in overall approval of courts). 
16. See ROBERT J. MACCOUN ET AL., ALTERNATIVE ADJUDICATION: AN EVALUATION OF THE NEW 
JERSEY AUTOMOBILE ARBITRATION PROGRAM 56-57 (1988) (finding that people are more 
willing to accept ADR awards if they feel that the procedures were procedurally just); TOM 
R. TYLER & YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC COOPERATION WITH 
THE POLICE AND COURTS, at xv, 123-29 (2002) (finding that people who have dealt with the 
courts were more willing to accept court decisions if they believed that the courts made 
those decisions in a procedurally just way); E. Allan Lind et al., Individual and Corporate 
Dispute Resolution: Using Procedural Fairness as a Decision Heuristic, 38 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 224, 224 
(1993) (finding that individual and corporate litigants were more accepting of the results of 
court-annexed arbitration hearings if they believed that the hearings were procedurally 
just).  
17. Tyler & Jackson, supra note 13 (finding that people who viewed the police and courts as 
exercising their authority fairly were more willing to report crime and be a witness in court). 
18. PENELOPE EILEEN BRYAN, CONSTRUCTIVE DIVORCE: PROCEDURAL JUSTICE AND SOCIOLEGAL 
REFORM (2006); Robert E. Emery et al., Child Custody Mediation and Litigation: Parents’ 
Satisfaction and Functioning One Year After Settlement, 62 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL 
PSYCHOL. 124 (1994); Tom R. Tyler et al., Reintegrative Shaming, Procedural Justice, and 
Recidivism: The Engagement of Offenders’ Psychological Mechanisms in the Canberra RISE 
Drinking-and-Driving Experiment, 41 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 553, 563-65 (2007) 
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3. Police  
Like courts, police are legal authorities with which the public interacts. An 
even larger body of research on the police suggests that people are more 
satisfied with police decisions when they believe that the police are exercising 
their authority through fair procedures.19 Studies further indicate that people 
                                                            
19. TYLER, supra note 13 (a study of the residents of Chicago indicating that those who believe 
the police are procedurally just comply with the law more frequently in their everyday lives); 
TYLER & HUO, supra note 16 (finding, in a study of everyday interactions with the police in 
Oakland and Los Angeles, that people are more satisfied with interactions when they believe 
that the police acted with procedural justice); Irina Elliott et al., Procedural Justice in Contacts 
with the Police: Testing a Relational Model of Authority in a Mixed Methods Study, 17 PSYCHOL. 
PUB. POL’Y & L. 592, 592 (2011) (“[F]indings supported the predictions that higher perceived 
antecedents of procedural justice would be associated with higher perceived legitimacy.”); 
Jacinta M. Gau & Rod K. Brunson, Consent Searches as a Threat to Procedural Justice and Police 
Legitimacy, 24 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 759, 759 (2013) (finding that “consent requests . . . 
damage perceptions of procedural justice and, moreover, of the legitimacy of the stop 
itself”); Jacinta M. Gau & Rod K. Brunson, Procedural Justice and Order Maintenance Policing: 
A Study of Inner-City Young Men’s Perceptions of Police Legitimacy, 27 JUST. Q. 255 (2010) 
[hereinafter Gau & Brunson, Procedural Justice] (finding that interviews with young people 
suggest that stops are viewed as unfair harassment); Lyn Hinds, Building Police-Youth 
Relationships: The Importance of Procedural Justice, 7 YOUTH JUST. 195, 195 (2007) (“Young 
people’s attitudes toward police legitimacy are positively linked to police use of procedural 
justice.”); Lyn Hinds & Kristina Murphy, Public Satisfaction with Police: Using Procedural 
Justice to Improve Police Legitimacy, 40 AUSTL. & N.Z. J. CRIMINOLOGY 27, 27 (2007) (“People 
who believe the police use procedural justice when they exercise their authority are more 
likely to view police as legitimate, and in turn are more satisfied with police services.”); Tal 
Jonathan-Zamir & David Weisburd, The Effects of Security Threats on Antecedents of Police 
Legitimacy: Findings from a Quasi-Experiment in Israel, 50 J. RES. CRIM. & DELINQ. 3, 4 (2013) 
(finding that in Israeli communities “procedural justice is consistently the primary 
antecedent of police legitimacy”); Lorraine Mazerolle et al., Shaping Citizen Perceptions of 
Police Legitimacy: A Randomized Field Trial of Procedural Justice, 51 CRIMINOLOGY 33 (2013) 
(showing through a randomized field experiment varying procedural justice that procedural 
justice shaped police legitimacy); Andy Myhill & Ben Bradford, Can Police Enhance Public 
Confidence by Improving Quality of Service? Results from Two Surveys in England and Wales, 22 
POLICING AND SOC’Y 397, 397 (2012) (finding that the key issue in the effect of encounters 
with police on perceived legitimacy is quality of “personal treatment”); Jennifer Norman, 
Seen and Not Heard: Young People’s Perceptions of the Police, 3 POLICING 364, 364 (2009) 
(finding that “unfair targeting and treatment from the police” undermined what “young 
people thought of the police”); Ralph B. Taylor & Brian A. Lawton, An Integrated Contextual 
Model of Confidence in Local Police, 15 POLICE Q. 414, 414 (2012) (finding, in a study of people 
in Pennsylvania, the “importance of police simultaneously maintaining order and treating 
citizens fairly”); Tom R. Tyler & Jeffrey Fagan, Legitimacy and Cooperation: Why Do People 
Cooperate with the Police?, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 231 (2008) (finding that procedural justice 
shaped legitimacy in a sample of New York City residents); Tom R. Tyler & Cheryl J. 
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are more willing to defer to police decisions when they feel the police are acting 
fairly.20 
The police benefit from cooperation with the community beyond mere 
compliance with rules. One form of cooperation involves helping the police to 
solve crimes or apprehend criminals. Providing tips about the location of 
crimes and criminals is a key issue, as is the willingness to aid with 
                                                                                                                                               
Wakslak, Profiling and Police Legitimacy: Procedural Justice, Attributions of Motive, and 
Acceptance of Police Authority, 42 CRIMINOLOGY 253 (2004) (analyzing several datasets to 
show that unfair treatment leads to inferences of racial profiling and undermine police 
legitimacy).  
20. JOHN D. MCCLUSKEY, POLICE REQUESTS FOR COMPLIANCE: COERCIVE AND PROCEDURALLY 
JUST TACTICS (2003) (suggesting, based on several studies involving both interviews with 
people who have dealt with the police and observation of police-citizen encounters, that 
procedural justice promotes compliance with police directives); Christina E.W. Bond & 
David John Gow, Policing the Beat: The Experience in Toowoomba, Queensland, 6 CRIME PREV. 
STUD. 153 (1996) (suggesting, through a qualitative analysis of a beat policing program, that 
it led to heightened satisfaction with police services); TYLER & HUO, supra note 16 (finding 
in a study of police-citizen encounters in California that people more willingly accepted 
fairly made decisions); Mengyan Dai et al., Procedural Justice During Police-Citizen 
Encounters: The Effects of Process-Based Policing on Citizen Compliance and Demeanor, 39 J. 
CRIM. JUST 159, 159 (2011) (“Two types of procedurally fair behavior by the police, police 
demeanor and their consideration of citizen voice, are significant in reducing citizen and 
noncompliance.”); Stephen D. Mastrofski et al., Compliance on Demand: The Public’s 
Response to Specific Police Requests, 33 J. RES. CRIM. & DELINQ. 269 (1996) (demonstrating 
through a study of people’s personal experience with the police that procedural fairness 
increases compliance); Alex R. Piquero et al., Discerning Unfairness Where Others May Not: 
Low Self-Control and Unfair Sanction Perceptions, 42 CRIMINOLOGY 699 (2004) (finding that 
perceiving sanctions as unfair leads to anger); Clifford Stott et al., “Keeping the Peace”: Social 
Identity, Procedural Justice and the Policing of Football Crowds, 52 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 381 
(2012) (finding that style of policing shaped compliance among European football crowds); 
Tom R. Tyler, What Is Procedural Justice?: Criteria Used by Citizens to Assess the Fairness of 
Legal Procedures, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 103 (1988) (outlining the relationship of different 
procedural justice elements to decision acceptance); Jeffrey T. Ward et al., Caught in Their 
Own Speed Trap: The Intersection of Speed Enforcement Policy, Police Legitimacy, and Decision 
Acceptance, 14 POLICE Q. 251 (2011) (finding that unfair ticketing procedures led to less 
compliance); Amy C. Watson & Beth Angell, The Role of Stigma and Uncertainty in 
Moderating the Effect of Procedural Justice on Cooperation and Resistance in Police Encounters 
with Persons with Mental Illnesses, 19 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 30, 30 (2013) (“Procedural 
justice is associated with more cooperation and less resistance.”); Andy Myhill & Paul 
Quinton, It’s a Fair Cop? Police Legitimacy, Public Cooperation, and Crime Reduction, NAT’L 
POLICING IMPROVEMENT AGENCY (2011), http://www.college.police.uk/en/docs/Fair_cop 
_Full_Report.pdf (finding that procedural justice shaped legitimacy, compliance and 
cooperation with the police among a national sample of the people of England). 
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prosecutions by participating in lineups and trials. Procedural fairness 
promotes such cooperation.21 
A second type of cooperation is working with the police to co-police 
neighborhoods. This could involve attending community meetings or joining a 
group such as neighborhood watch.22 In contrast to the first category of 
behavior, these actions are more proactive and organized. Again, if people 
believe the police act fairly, they are more likely to join cooperative efforts in 
their community.23 
                                                            
21. See, e.g., JONATHAN JACKSON ET AL., JUST AUTHORITY? TRUST IN THE POLICE IN ENGLAND 
AND WALES 215 (2013) (“The procedural fairness of the police lies at the heart of people’s 
connections with legal authorities.”); Phillip Atiba Goff et al., Crossing the Line of Legitimacy: 
The Impact of Cross-Deputization Policy on Crime Reporting, 19 PSYCH. PUB. POL’Y & L. 250, 254 
(2013) (finding that viewing the police as less legitimate lowers the likelihood of reporting a 
crime); Lyn Hinds, Youth, Police Legitimacy and Informal Contact, 24 J. POLICE & CRIM. 
PSYCHOL. 10 (2009) (finding that young people who view the police as legitimate are more 
willing to help them); Tammy Rinehart Kochel, Can Police Legitimacy Promote Collective 
Efficacy?, 29 JUST. Q. 384 (2012) (finding that legitimacy promotes collective efficacy among 
the residents of Trinidad and Tobago); Kristina Murphy, Does Procedural Justice Matter to 
Youth? Comparing Adults’ and Youths’ Willingness to Collaborate with Police, 23 POLICING & 
SOC’Y 1, 12 (2013) (finding that those respondents who feel fairly treated are more willing to 
collaborate with the police); Kristina Murphy et al., Encouraging Public Cooperation and 
Support for Police, 18 POLICING & SOC’Y 136, 136, 144-46 (2008) (observing that the results of 
several surveys suggest that “views about police legitimacy do influence public cooperation 
with the police, and that those who view the police as more legitimate are more likely to 
assist the police to control crime,” and that “[t]he key antecedent of legitimacy is procedural 
justice”); Michael D. Reisig & Camille Lloyd, Procedural Justice, Police Legitimacy, and 
Helping the Police Fight Crime: Results from a Survey of Jamaican Adolescents, 12 POLICE Q. 42, 
56 (2009) (finding that among Jamaican high school students procedural justice and 
legitimacy led to the willingness to report suspects to the police); Sunshine & Tyler, supra 
note 13, at 526-27; Tom R. Tyler et al., Legitimacy and Deterrence Effects in Counter-Terrorism 
Policing: A Study of Muslim-Americans, 44 LAW & SOC’Y REV, 365, 368 (2010) (finding, in a 
survey of Muslim Americans, that people’s willingness to help the police identify terrorist 
risks was linked to perceived police procedural justice); Tyler & Fagan, supra note 19 
(finding that procedural justice shaped legitimacy in a sample of New York City residents); 
Tyler et al., supra note 13 (finding that young men who viewed the police as acting through 
procedural justice were more willing to help by reporting crimes); Tyler & Jackson, supra 
note 13, at 78-79 (finding, in a study of a random sample of Americans’ views about the 
police and the courts, that procedural justice shapes legitimacy, compliance and 
cooperation); Myhill & Quinton, supra note 20, at 2-3 (finding that police procedural 
fairness led to cooperation with the police in a national sample of the people in England).  
22. See, e.g., Tracey Meares, Praying for Community Policing, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1593 (2002). 
23. See Mazerolle et al., supra note 19, at 35; Sunshine & Tyler, supra note 13, at 526-27; Tyler et 
al., supra note 21, at 368; Tyler & Fagan, supra note 19, at 250-52. 
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What messages can judges, whether Supreme Court Justices or local 
magistrates, draw from these findings? The primary lesson is that commitment 
to fair procedures in decisionmaking is important, but that it is equally 
important to communicate to the public how justice is being done so that the 
public knows that judges are making decisions fairly. In other words judges 
need to both be fair and to be seen as being fair. These two factors, importantly, 
are not coincident. Being seen or perceived as fair involves transparency in 
procedures, explanation of rules and decisions, and the promotion of 
procedures that give interested parties a voice in the proceedings. Many judges 
devote their attention to being fair, i.e., to correctly applying the law to the 
facts of each case, but do not think about how they can communicate that they 
are being fair to the parties in the case or to the public more generally. 
Recognizing that those parties are themselves focused upon whether their case 
was handled fairly highlights the importance of attention to the issue of 
communicating how the case was handled and decisions were made.  
B. Fair Procedures Communicate Relational Value.  
Discussions of procedural fairness usually begin with a focus upon the 
decision-making elements we have already noted.24 A focus on decisionmaking 
accords with the traditional legal framing of procedural design as being about 
how legal authorities structure trials and deliberations about cases. A fair judge 
is one who correctly applies the law to the facts in a particular case, usually 
with the goal of achieving the correct outcome. However, studies of the 
popular meaning of procedural justice suggest that the public considers a 
broader range of issues when evaluating the fairness of judicial 
decisionmaking. These broader issues are referred to as relational issues 
because they are related to the social messages communicated by the courts. 
The quality of the treatment that people receive is relational because it sends 
messages that people use to interpret their degree of inclusion within society 
and their social status/standing. In other words, decisionmaking is not only 
about the issues in dispute. Rather, it is about people’s right to come before a 
court and to have their needs and concerns taken seriously by the authorities. 
As we have noted, the public is less concerned with whether the right outcome 
is achieved than they are about other relational matters. Interestingly, Justice 
Sotomayor touched directly upon this broader set of elements. 
                                                            
24. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.  
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What relational aspects of procedure matter to the public, and why? The 
public first focuses upon whether they feel treated with dignity and respect. 
This includes respect for people’s rights as members of the community and for 
their status as people. They care about quality of treatment more than they care 
about the extent to which a decision favors them. The question, of course, is 
why this is the case. The quality of the treatment that people experience when 
dealing with societal authorities conveys social messages. High-quality 
treatment by legal authorities first conveys a message of inclusion, since respect 
for one’s rights indicates standing with the community. Membership in the 
community (“citizenship”) confers rights, and their recognition acknowledges 
that inclusion. Everyone in the community is an equally entitled human being, 
with the same rights as others. Quality of treatment communicates a message 
about whether authorities acknowledge that equality in standing.25 
Second, treatment with respect indicates one’s status within society. When 
an authority is demeaning or disrespectful to someone who appears before 
them, or whose interests or values are involved in a case, that treatment 
communicates marginal social status. Being taken seriously, on the other hand, 
communicates social respect and high standing within the community. The 
standing of one’s group or oneself is important to self-esteem because even 
when formally included within the general framework of rights, people can be 
treated as marginal, or, conversely, as valuable. While minorities have legal 
rights, they may nonetheless feel that they are viewed as socially inferior and 
less desirable than members of other social groups.  
In addition to being concerned about issues involving the quality of 
treatment, people key in on their ability to trust in the character and motivation 
of judicial authorities. When people evaluate an authority, they make a 
judgment about that person’s intentions. If they believe that the authority is 
sincerely seeking to do what is right, to consider the needs and concerns of the 
public to find a solution that is good for the people of the community, then 
people view that authority as trustworthy. Trust comes from the inference of 
such intentions. It is the expectation of future benevolence that is the product 
of repeated respectful interactions and a general sense of congruence of 
                                                            
25. Equality in standing is important in terms of public support because studies by social 
scientists find that the use of equality in groups fosters identification with and loyalty 
toward the group and its authorities. See MORTON DEUTSCH, DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 196-97 
(1985). It is for this reason that when authorities want to make decisions that promote 
solidarity they use the principle of equality. David M. Messick & Terry Schell, Evidence for 
an Equality Heuristic in Social Decision Making, 80 ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA 311 (1992).  
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values.26 Again, Justice Sotomayor touches directly upon this issue when she 
publicly recognizes the good intentions of other Justices and expresses her wish 
that the public were more widely aware that Justices are not motivated by ill 
will, but rather by good-faith efforts to do what they believe is right.27  
Yuen Huo’s research on how the public deals with disliked groups is 
relevant here. A perennial issue in law is determining what obligations society 
owes to minority groups that want to express unpopular ideas through 
teaching, through public demonstrations, or in other ways. Huo presents 
members of the public with such groups and asks about several types of denials 
that might occur. The public regards the most acceptable form of denial as the 
refusal to provide resources to allow the group to promote its agenda. An 
intermediately acceptable denial is to deny the group rights, such as the right to 
speak or assemble. However, the least acceptable form of denial is to treat 
members of the group disrespectfully. In other words, of all the forms of 
injustice, disrespect is viewed as the most objectionable.28 
What is most striking about Justice Sotomayor’s comments on legal 
procedures is how consistent they are with current psychological perspectives 
on why procedural justice is so central to people’s evaluations of legal 
procedures. As we have noted, there are two elements to procedural justice: 
quality of decision making and quality of treatment. Early treatments of 
procedural justice developed out of models of court procedure; they 
emphasized the goals of finding accurate information and using that 
information to make objectively just substantive decisions. Early psychological 
research followed this model and focused upon using fair procedures as a 
mechanism for obtaining outcomes that those involved would judge to be 
substantively fair. Essentially, this model follows the line of argument outlined 
by Justice Sotomayor that the enactment of fair procedures maximizes the 
likelihood of obtaining substantively appropriate outcomes. This is the model 
that framed the classic research of John Thibaut and Laurens Walker on the 
perceived fairness of inquisitorial and adversarial trial procedures.29  
While this model has considerable plausibility and fits well within a legal 
framework, it has not been found to be a good description of the way that 
people actually evaluate the legal system. This is true irrespective of whether 
                                                            
26. Tyler & Jackson, supra note 13. 
27. See Sotomayor & Greenhouse, supra note 4, at 3, 8. 
28. Yuen J. Huo, Justice and the Regulation of Social Relations: When and Why Do Group Members 
Deny Claims to Social Goods?, 41 BRIT. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 535 (2002). 
29. THIBAUT & WALKER, supra note 6. 
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we are talking about people who are involved in actual cases as litigants or the 
general public when it is evaluating the court system as a legal institution. As 
we have noted, public evaluations center most heavily around issues of quality 
of treatment rather than upon evaluations of the quality of the decisionmaking 
of the courts.  
How can we understand the public’s focus on quality of treatment over the 
quality of decisionmaking by legal authorities? The key is the framework 
provided by the relational model of authority. When people evaluate legal 
authorities, their concerns are to some degree about particular issues or 
outcomes, but to a greater extent they are focused on whether authorities will 
acknowledge their right to bring issues and have their needs and concerns 
taken seriously. This perspective suggests that a central concern for many 
people is that authorities respect the public and acknowledge its right to 
respectful treatment. They also seek reassurance that authorities will take them 
seriously, considering their needs and concerns and making decisions that are 
responsive to them.  
Fair procedures are important because they provide reassurance that those 
in positions of legal authority are attending to these relational issues. As a 
consequence, when people deal with an authority or are members of a group, 
organization, community, or society and see evidence that fair procedures are 
shaping decisions, rules, and policies, then they merge their sense of self with 
the group, intertwining their identities with group values. As people identify 
more closely with others and the institutions and authorities that unite them, 
they engage in a variety of group supporting behaviors, including following 
rules, accepting decisions, cooperating with authorities, and generally taking 
actions that people perceive will help their group.30 Recent research, in fact, is 
able to disentangle the relative effects of people’s commitment to fair 
procedures because of their belief that such procedures lead to more accurate or 
just outcomes from the effects of their commitment to fair procedures because 
such procedures support more positive self identity.31 
                                                            
30. TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE COOPERATE: THE ROLE OF SOCIAL MOTIVATIONS (2011); TOM 
R. TYLER & STEVEN L. BLADER, COOPERATION IN GROUPS (2000).  
31. A recent analysis of public support for local courts provides an example of relational effects. 
This analysis compares the relative influence of people’s belief that fairer procedures lead to 
greater substantive justice to the direct influence of fair procedures on legitimacy. It is this 
direct effect that reflects the relational influence of fairness upon legitimacy and law-related 
behaviors. In a comparison of influences upon legitimacy among Americans it was found 
that the primary factor was relational, with only a secondary influence of the decision-
making aspects of fair procedures. See Tom Tyler & Justin Sevier, How Do the Courts Create 
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These findings support Justice Sotomayor’s broader conception of what 
fairness looks like. Her efforts to humanize the Court by communicating 
respect to members of the public and to highlight the sincere and principled 
behavior of Justices touch on two core elements of public conceptions of 
fairness and hence are central to legitimating the court to the American public. 
Her comments suggest that the Justice has her finger on the pulse of the 
American public and hence has a good sense of how to create and maintain 
legitimacy for the Court and its decisions. 
We live in an era of widespread distrust in our major social and political 
institutions. One focus of distrust is political authority, including the executive 
(51% of respondents express a great deal or a fair amount of trust), legislative 
(34%), and judicial (62%) branches of government.32 Although the judiciary 
fares reasonably well in contrast to the other branches of government, the 
proportion of Americans expressing a similar level of trust in the judiciary in 
2003 was 75%.33 Hence, Justice Sotomayor’s effort seems timely. 
Studies of public reactions to both the Supreme Court and to local courts, 
as well as to other legal authorities such as the police and administrative 
agencies, demonstrate that when people talk about having experienced a fair or 
an unfair procedure, they make their determination by considering both the 
fairness of decisionmaking and the fairness of treatment. These same studies 
further suggest that fairness of treatment is of particular importance. 
1. U.S. Supreme Court 
Recent efforts to understand public views about the Court have identified a 
broad set of issues that shape perceptions and presented an image of public 
support that includes relational concerns.  
Professors Gibson and Caldeira interviewed a randomly chosen sample of 
Americans and found that legitimacy was linked to issues of principle and 
sincerity. Judges are viewed as acting out of a sincere effort to make decisions 
                                                                                                                                               
Popular Legitimacy?: The Role of Establishing the Truth, Punishing Justly and/or Acting Through 
Fair Procedures, 77 ALB. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm 
?abstract_id=2396945. 
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based upon principle, rather than in a strategic effort to advance their own self-
interest (unlike members of Congress).34  
Professor Kahan argues that the challenge for the Court is to transcend the 
tendency for people to view it through the lens of their prior perceptions of 
policy-relevant facts (or “motivated reasoning”).35 Kahan notes that “citizens of 
diverse values are prone to forming opposing perceptions of the Supreme 
Court’s neutrality.”36 Kahan’s insight is interesting because he suggests that the 
key to gaining acceptance does not lie only in a greater effort by the Court to 
explain its decisionmaking procedures. He suggests that the Court may be 
required to “say much more than is required strictly to decide a case.”37 
Kahan argues that instead of elaborating its reasoning to promote 
confidence in its impartiality, the Court should consider social-psychological 
strategies for countering motivated reasoning. One principle is “aporia,” the 
acknowledgement of the complexity of the issues involved in a case.38 This 
acknowledgement, as Kahan outlines it, reflects a willingness on the part of the 
Justices to be inclusive by acknowledging the arguments made by those on all 
sides of an issue. This shows everyone involved that the Court is giving fair 
and open-minded consideration to opposing arguments.39 Kahan’s argument 
reflects the same spirit as Justice Sotomayor’s attempt to make her colleagues’ 
principled efforts to reason through cases transparent to the public. 
Kahan’s second principle is affirmation.40 Here, he emphasizes the idea of 
respect for people, their rights, and their standing in society. He argues that the 
Court should explicitly affirm people’s possession of valued traits and 
characteristics by communicating respect for the status and values of the 
groups with which they identify.41 This should be done for all the different 
parties involved in a case. Such recognition of people and the groups that shape 
                                                            
34. James L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldeira, Has Legal Realism Damaged the Legitimacy of the U.S. 
Supreme Court?, 45 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 213 (2011) (“[L]egitimacy seems to flow from the view 
that discretion is being exercised in a principled, rather than strategic, way.”).  
35. Dan M. Kahan, The Supreme Court 2010 Term—Foreword: Neutral Principles, Motivated 
Cognition, and Some Problems for Constitutional Law, 125 HARV. L. REV. 19 (2011). 
36. Id. at 58. 
37. Id. at 71. 
38. Id. at 62. 
39. Id. at 63. 
40. Id. at 67. 
41. Id. 
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their identity not only promotes the Court’s legitimacy, but also solidifies 
public identification with society and government.  
Social-psychological research on minorities shows that displays of 
subgroup respect promote identification with social institutions, along with 
social engagement and psychological well-being among minority groups.42 
This research builds upon the general finding, already noted, that when people 
deal with others—particularly authorities representing a group to which they 
belong—they are looking for information about the status they and their group 
have. In other words, are they, their values, and their identity respected within 
the larger society? If so, they identify more closely with the larger society and 
adopt its values, including loyalty to overarching legal and political authorities. 
On the other hand, messages of disrespect and exclusion promote extra-legal 
behaviors such as violence.43  
Tom Tyler and Margarita Krochik further explored the psychology of 
support for the Court or Congress in the context of ideological conflicts.44 They 
used a vignette procedure in which those who completed a questionnaire were 
first told that the Court had made a decision consistent with or opposed to 
their own views on a controversial economic or social issue. Their findings 
suggest that judgments about the fairness of procedures did shape the 
willingness to accept Court decisions above and beyond whether those 
decisions reflected the person’s own social or economic values. Overall, three 
factors mattered. The first was whether or not people assessed that the Court 
or Congress made decisions fairly (that is, principled decision making). The 
second was whether people felt that the Court or Congress considered public 
concerns when making decisions. And, the third was whether people felt that 
the Court or Congress respected public values. Of these three issues, the one 
most central to accepting Court decisions was whether the Court was seen as 
considering public concerns.45 
                                                            
42. Yuen J. Huo & Ludwin E. Molina, Is Pluralism a Viable Model of Diversity?: The Benefits and 
Limits of Subgroup Respect, 9 GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP RELATIONS 359 (2006); Yuen 
J. Huo et al., Subgroup Respect, Social Engagement, and Well-Being: A Field Study of an 
Ethnically Diverse High School, 16 CULTURAL DIVERSITY & ETHNIC MINORITY PSYCHOL. 427 
(2010). 
43. Joy D. Leary et al., The African American Adolescent Respect Scale: A Measure of a Prosocial 
Attitude, 15 RES. ON SOC. WORK PRAC. 462 (2005). 
44. Tom Tyler & Margarita Krochik, Deference to Authority as a Basis for Managing Ideological 
Conflict, 88 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 433 (2013). 
45. Id. at 445. 
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2. Local Courts 
It is also possible to consider the legitimacy of local courts. Tom Tyler & 
Justin Sevier used information collected from a national sample of Americans 
to examine the legitimacy of local courts.46 They examined the degree to which 
court legitimacy was based upon the quality of the decisionmaking of the 
courts, defined as the frequency with which the courts were believed to make 
accurate decisions and to punish appropriately. Although their results indicate 
that legitimacy is, to some extent, based upon the evaluation of the quality of 
decisionmaking of the courts, the primary factor shaping legitimacy is the 
perceived quality of the treatment people received from judicial authorities. 
This includes whether people believe that they are respected when they deal 
with the courts and whether they think that judges care about and consider 
people’s needs and concerns when making decisions. The study also shows 
that people are more willing to cooperate with the courts when they view them 
as legitimate. This includes a greater willingness to bring disputes to court 
instead of engaging in private violence and more willingness to be a witness in 
a court proceeding. 
What implications do these findings have for the Court? First, they suggest 
the wisdom and value of the efforts that Justice Sotomayor is already 
undertaking to strengthen the connection between the Court and the public. 
And research findings support the Justice’s intuition that this effort needs to be 
broader than focusing on the neutrality and factuality of Court 
decisionmaking. Those are important elements of the public’s view of the 
Court, but research findings point to issues of trust in the motives of the 
Justices and their willingness to recognize and acknowledge public concerns. 
Hence, these are obvious points of contact with the public. 
C. Fair Procedures Legitimize Authorities and Institutions, Promote 
Identification with Government, and Lead to Higher Levels of Compliance 
and Cooperation  
In her comments, Justice Sotomayor suggests that the long-term goals in 
making and explaining judicial decisions should be to build respect for the law 
as an important institution in our lives and to enable people to identify with 
democracy. Again, social science findings suggest that the way to achieve these 
goals is in exactly the manner the Justice outlines. Studies suggest clearly that 
                                                            
46. Tyler & Sevier, supra note 31. 
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authorities and institutions gain legitimacy and promote identification with 
themselves and the community they represent when they exercise their 
authority fairly.47 Legitimacy has important consequences, therefore, for the 
viability of law, government, and society. 
Procedural justice is important at several stages institutionally. First, it is 
important when rules are being formulated. Here, people value the 
opportunity to participate by being able to express their views and deliberate 
with others as rules are being formulated. Once rules exist, people focus on 
whether procedural justice occurs as rules are implemented, including fair 
decisionmaking and fair treatment. The connection of procedural justice to 
legitimacy is direct for both the Supreme Court and for local courts and other 
                                                            
47. TYLER, supra note 13 (suggesting, through a study of the residents of Chicago, that those 
who believe the police are procedurally just comply with the law more frequently in their 
everyday lives); Bradford, supra note 15, at 345 (“By providing [crime] victims with voice 
and a sense that someone is listening to and taking their concerns seriously, contact with 
victims services seems to be linked to more favourable overall assessments of the criminal 
justice system.”); Elliott et al., supra note 19, at 592 (“[F]indings supported the predictions 
that higher perceived antecedents of procedural justice would be associated with higher 
perceived legitimacy.”); Gau & Brunson, Procedural Justice, supra note 19; Badi Hasisi & 
David Weisburd, Going Beyond Ascribed Identities: The Importance of Procedural Justice in 
Airport Security Screening in Israel, 45 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 867 (2011) (finding that procedural 
justice during airport security screening shapes the legitimacy of the police and their 
procedures); Hinds, supra note 19, at 195 (“Young people’s attitudes toward police 
legitimacy are positively linked to police use of procedural justice.”); Hinds & Murphy, 
supra note 19, at 27 (“People who believe the police use procedural justice when they exercise 
their authority are more likely to view police as legitimate, and in turn are more satisfied 
with police services.”); Jonathan-Zamir & Weisburd, supra note 19, at 4 (finding that in 
Israeli communities “procedural justice is consistently the primary antecedent of police 
legitimacy”); Mazerolle et al., supra note 19; Myhill & Bradford, supra note 19, at 397 
(finding that the key issue in the effect of encounters with police on perceived legitimacy is 
quality of “personal treatment”); Taylor & Lawton, supra note 19, at 414 (finding, in a study 
of people in Pennsylvania, the “importance of police simultaneously maintaining order and 
treating citizens fairly”); Tyler, Public Trust, supra note 15, at 215 (“Analysis from several 
studies exploring the basis of public views support this procedural justice based model of 
public evaluation.”); Tom R. Tyler et al., Maintaining Allegiance Toward Political Authorities: 
The Role of Prior Attitudes and the Use of Fair Procedures, 33 AM. J. POL. SCI. 629 (1989) 
(showing that people on trial for felonies generalize from the procedural justice they feel 
they received in their trial to their views about law and government legitimacy); Wemmers 
et al., supra note 15 (finding that Dutch crime victims evaluated the criminal justice process 
through a procedural justice frame); Abuwala & Farole, supra note 15 (finding that 
interviews with people appearing in the Harlem and downtown project courts suggest that 
fairer treatment was linked to higher satisfaction with the courts); Farole, supra note 15, at 17 
(finding that interviews with people appearing in the Harlem and downtown project courts 
suggest that fairer treatment was linked to higher satisfaction with the courts). 
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legal authorities. When judges act fairly, the public feels a stronger obligation 
to defer to their decisions and support the institutions they represent. 
In addition, the use of fair procedures builds identification with authorities 
and the communities they represent. For example, research shows that when 
people evaluate the police in their community as acting fairly, their 
identification with the police is greater48—a result that resonates deeply with 
Justice Sotomayor’s comments in her Thomas Lecture. As an example, people 
who were treated fairly by the police were more likely to think that they shared 
a similar background with police officers and could understand their actions. 
Further, they felt that those officers respected them and their values. They were 
also more likely to indicate that they felt they “belonged in their community” 
and that being a resident of their community was “important to the way they 
thought of themselves as a person.”49 
Research further demonstrates that, as Justice Sotomayor suggests, there 
are important positive consequences for communities in which people identify 
with legal and governmental authorities and institutions and the community 
they represent.50 Studies by social psychologists demonstrate that when people 
identify with a group they blur the distinction between self-interest and group-
interest. They increasingly view the well-being of the group as central to their 
own identify and work on behalf of the group. Of particular importance is the 
increasingly voluntary nature of cooperation with the group that develops out 
of identification. People want their group to be successful and group success 
becomes the same as personal success.51  
Finally, the Justice’s comments are strikingly convergent with recent social 
science research concerning potential goals for the legal system and their 
relationship to popular legitimacy. Traditionally, legal authorities primarily 
focused on obtaining public compliance with the law. Both legitimacy and 
sanction threats are found to motivate compliance.52 Increasingly, discussions 
of law and legal authority have emphasized the importance of willing 
acceptance, voluntary acceptance, and cooperation as goals for legal 
authorities.53 This shift is important because, unlike compliance, voluntary 
                                                            
48. Tyler & Fagan, supra note 19, at 260. 
49. TYLER, supra note 30. 
50. Tyler & Jackson, supra note 13. 
51. TYLER, supra note 30, at 146-66 (summarizing factors contributing to group-based 
motivation). 
52. TYLER, supra note 13. 
53. Tyler & Jackson, supra note 13. 
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deference and willing cooperation are heavily dependent upon popular 
legitimacy, making having such legitimacy increasingly important just at a time 
when many institutions are seeing declines in public trust and confidence. 
While cooperation is not the same goal as compliance, both of these goals 
are often conceptualized similarly in that their focus is on the issues associated 
with maintaining social order—i.e., reporting crimes and criminals, being 
involved in a neighborhood watch, testifying in court, or serving on juries. The 
legal system increasingly depends upon such cooperation as the number of 
societal resources that can be devoted to legal institutions declines.  
However, police authorities increasingly recognize that the problem of 
social order cannot be separated from community problems, and you cannot 
arrest your way out of crime.54 Hence the issue is whether legal authority can 
be exercised in ways that promote identification with communities, encourage 
economic and social activity, and promote the overall legitimacy of 
government. Studies suggest that experiences with the legal system do 
influence views about government.55 Similarly, the results of a recent national 
survey of Americans suggest that when people evaluate their police and court 
systems as procedurally fair, they identify more with their communities and 
engage in them socially, by trusting neighbors; politically, by voting; and 
economically, by shopping and going to entertainment venues within that 
community.56 Hence, trust in law and legal authorities can promote 
community well-being and support for government. 
Justice Sotomayor’s comments anticipate and complement this discussion 
of the important role of the local police and courts in creating a climate for 
social, political, and economic development. People thrive when they feel 
reassurance where they live and work. It is important for people to feel that if 
they call upon the police and courts their security will be protected, but also 
that they will be treated with respect and their rights recognized if they deal 
with those authorities. Of course, most people in a community seldom call 
upon the police or the courts for services, but the police and courts are in the 
background in every community and shape what people think, feel, and do. 
                                                            
54. Tracey L. Meares, The Good Cop: Knowing the Difference Between Lawful or Effective Policing 
and Rightful Policing—And Why It Matters, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1865 (2012); Tracey L. 
Meares, Norms, Legitimacy and Law Enforcement, 79 OR. L. REV. 391 (2000); Tracey L. 
Meares & Dan M. Kahan, Law and (Norms of) Order in the Inner City, 32 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 
805 (1998). 
55. E.g., Tyler et al., supra note 47. 
56. Tyler & Jackson, supra note 13. 
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People want to feel comfort, not fear, when the police are present and to 
anticipate that they will receive help and professional treatment if they need it. 
Similarly, as a prerequisite to making contracts and working with others, 
people want to feel that if they are involved in a dispute they can trust the 
courts to rectify injustices. 
Of course, Justice Sotomayor is not the only Supreme Court Justice to 
recognize the role of law and legal authorities in promoting communities and 
government. Justice Breyer similarly argues that the courts are central to 
creating a context in which communities can “respond to a universal need 
present in every society, that for some method for resolving disputes among 
individuals.”57 Further, Justice Breyer recognizes the importance of Court 
legitimacy, suggesting that “public acceptance is not automatic and cannot be 
taken for granted. The Court itself must help maintain the public’s trust in the 
Court, the public’s confidence in the Constitution, and the public’s 
commitment to the rule of law.”58 And he notes the need to motivate political 
participation as a way of maintaining a viable democracy. He notes: “The 
Constitution’s efforts to create democratic political institutions mean little 
unless the public participates in American political life.”59 However, Justice 
Breyer does not address the issue of how the Court can facilitate these goals. It 
is the pairing of these goals with a strategy for achieving them that brings 
Justice Sotomayor’s comments so sharply into line with recent social science 
findings. 
summary 
There is a striking correspondence between the findings of recent research 
on the psychology of popular legitimacy and the jurisprudence of Justice 
Sotomayor. While she does not do so, the Justice could cite a wide range of 
recent social science scholarship in support of her perspective on how the 
courts should function so as to best build a viable society. 
There are several potential benefits of calling attention to that research. 
One reason is to provide support for her perspective. As we have noted, both 
judges in general and Supreme Court Justices in particular have approached 
                                                            
57. STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK 138 (2010). 
58. Id. at xiii. 
59. Id. at 215. 
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judging from a range of theories of interpretation.60 How can we decide which 
perspective on interpretation ought to be used? One approach is to identify 
goals and then consider what we know from empirical research about how to 
achieve those goals.61 
Social science research has illuminated some of these goals, including the 
ability to gain public deference to court decisions, the capacity to enhance 
public willingness to empower courts to resolve conflicts and evaluate laws and 
policies, and the capability of the communities and the overall structure of 
government within which the court system exists. All of these goals are 
addressed both by local courts and, at a national level, by federal courts, 
including the Supreme Court. How can these goals be achieved? As we have 
outlined, social science suggests that the key to public support is popular 
legitimacy. Further, the central factor shaping popular legitimacy is an 
evaluation of the fairness with which the courts exercise their authority. The 
widespread nature and strength of these findings argues for the value of relying 
upon this social science framing as a way of evaluating interpretive strategies of 
judicial decisionmaking both at the local and the federal level. 
These social science findings can help to sharpen Justice Sotomayor’s 
general message. When she argues for the value of humanizing the justices and 
respecting the public, her argument is anecdotal and general in tone. The social 
science findings outlined here are more specific and provide a set of guidelines 
for implementing a strategy to achieve the goals she articulates. In particular, 
efforts to humanize judges can benefit from social science models of motive-
based trust—the factors that shape inferences about the character and intention 
of authorities—and respect for the public can be bolstered by considering the 
important role that authorities such as judges play in communicating messages 
about inclusion and status. 
                                                            
60. Interestingly textualism is also defended by Justice Scalia by reference to public support for 
the courts. In his book with Bryan Garner, ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING 
LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (2012), Justice Scalia argues that “[t]he descent 
into social rancor over judicial decisions is largely traceable to nontextual means of 
interpretation, which erodes society’s confidence in a rule of law.” Id. at xxviii. He suggests 
this erosion then leads to a decline of faith in democratic institutions. Justice Scalia’s focus 
upon the content of opinions as a source of legitimacy is different from the perspective being 
advocated in this Essay, but the quote shows that, irrespective of how Justices think the 
Court is legitimated, they recognize that impact upon popular legitimacy is a criterion 
against which to evaluate the actions of the Court. 
61. Tracey L. Meares & Bernard E. Harcourt, Transparent Adjudication and Social Science Research 
in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 733 (1999). 
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Finally, the social science findings outlined above point to the limits of the 
type of instrumental models of legal and political authority that have 
dominated legal scholarship and judicial decisionmaking over the last several 
decades. The instrumental model suggests that people’s connection to law and 
legal authority is primarily shaped by the outcomes that people experience. On 
this model, the central public concerns about local courts are about the cost of 
litigation, the time it takes, and the favorability of outcomes. Similarly, public 
concerns with federal courts mainly center around obtaining desirable policy 
decisions.  
In contrast, the large body of research we note here highlights that the 
public connection to the courts is primarily motivated by a desire for non-
instrumental notions of justice, a finding also supported by recent studies of 
the motivations underlying litigation. For example, Gillian Hadfield has found 
that litigation decisions by 9/11 victims were motivated by nonmonetary 
concerns about values and accountability;62 Tamara Relis has shown that the 
concerns of medical malpractice victims are shaped by principles that include 
the desire for treatment with dignity and respect, the desire to be heard, and 
the desire for those responsible to be blamed for their wrongdoing;63 and Tess 
Wilkinson-Ryan and David Hoffman have demonstrated that reactions to 
contract breaches are influenced by inferences concerning the character of the 
other party and their perceived intentions in breaching the contract.64 
Similarly, decisions about whether or not to appeal court decisions are shaped 
by non-instrumental issues. In particular, litigants want to receive a hearing on 
issues that they feel were not heard in the trial court, with people interpreting 
the court’s willingness to grant such a hearing as vindicating them in the sense 
that the court is acknowledging the importance of listening to them articulate 
their needs and concerns even if it does not accept their legal arguments.65 
People’s relationship to judges and courts, in other words, is centered around 
the very type of non-instrumental issues we have outlined here—issues that 
Justice Sotomayor, in her writings and jurisprudence, seems to deeply 
understand. 
                                                            
62. Gillian K. Hadfield, Framing the Choice Between Cash and the Courthouse: Experiences with the 
9/11 Victim Compensation Fund, 42 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 645 (2008).  
63. Tamara Relis, “It’s Not About the Money!”: A Theory on Misconceptions of Plaintiffs’ Litigation 
Aims, 68 U. PITT. L. REV. 341 (2006).  
64. Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & David A. Hoffman, Breach Is for Suckers, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1003 
(2010).  
65. SCOTT BARCLAY, AN APPEALING ACT: WHY PEOPLE APPEAL IN CIVIL CASES (1999).  
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